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I. INTRODUCTION
If all your “ex’s (ex-spouses) live in Texas,” current Fifth Circuit
law warns that any property transferred, but not yet recorded, pursu-
ant to a divorce decree while in Texas may be used to satisfy your ex-
spouse’s tax debt.1  In addition, by “hang[ing your] hat in Tennessee”
your property may soon be subject to similar treatment by the Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS).2
Section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code states:
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
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If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after
demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to
tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition
thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and
rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.3
In addition:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same within
10 days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary to collect
such tax (and such further sum as shall be sufficient to cover the expenses of
the levy) by levy upon all property and rights to property (except such prop-
erty as is exempt under section 6334) belonging to such person or on which
there is a lien provided in this chapter for the payment of such tax.4
Courts are to begin their analysis by looking to state law to determine
the rights a taxpayer has in the property, then to federal law in decid-
ing whether the “property” or “rights to property” are within the legis-
lative scope of the federal tax lien.5
For most § 6321 tax liens, the property that the government has
placed a lien on will clearly belong to the delinquent taxpayer.  How-
ever, in situations where 1) a couple divorces, 2) a couple transfers
real property due to divorce proceedings, 3) the designated party fails
to adequately record the conveying instrument, and 4) the transferor
incurs a tax deficiency, the determination of what interest remained
in the transferor can become a hotly contested dispute.
Currently, the federal circuits are split on this issue.  The Fifth
Circuit, arguing in the present minority, holds that a federal tax lien
has priority over a docketed divorce decree that has not yet been re-
corded.6  The majority of circuits, however, hold that the delinquent
taxpayer has no remaining interest in said property after such convey-
ance, recorded or not, to which the tax lien could attach.7  Recently,
the IRS has reaffirmed its position that there is an interest remaining
in the taxpayer and seems set to litigate if necessary—this time in the
Sixth Circuit.8
3. I.R.C. § 6321 (2006).
4. Id. § 6331(a).
5. Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 58 (1999); see Aquilino v. United States, 363
U.S. 509, 513 (1960) (holding that courts, in determining “the nature of the legal
interest” that a taxpayer has in the property the Government seeks under a tax
lien, should look first to state law (quoting Morgan v. Comm’r, 309 U.S. 78, 82
(1940)); United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 55 (1958) (stating that a federal tax
lien “creates no property rights but merely attaches consequences, federally de-
fined, to rights created under state law”); cf. Morgan, 309 U.S. at 80 (“State law
creates legal interests and rights.  The federal revenue acts designate what inter-
ests or rights, so created, shall be taxed.”).
6. Prewitt v. United States, 792 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1986).  This argument is de-
tailed below in section II.A.
7. United States v. Gibbons, 71 F.3d 1496 (10th Cir. 1995); Thomson v. United
States, 66 F.3d 160 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. V & E Eng’g & Constr. Co.,
819 F.2d 331 (1st Cir. 1987).  This argument is discussed in detail in section II.B.
8. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 24,039 (June 18, 2010).
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The following cases demonstrate the need for standardized treat-
ment of the IRS in relation to a state’s recording requirements, espe-
cially when dealing with an unrecorded divorce decree.  While state
law defines what interest a taxpayer retains after such conveyance,
this Note suggests that future courts should adopt the majority ap-
proach when determining what interest the IRS acquires after issu-
ance of a § 6321 tax lien on a taxpayer’s real property.  This Note
begins, in Part II, by discussing the major cases in the circuit courts
that have led to this dispute, along with the recent IRS General Coun-
sel Memorandum which has reignited the conflict.  Then in section
III.A, this Note demonstrates that a § 6321 tax lien should only attach
to the interests of the taxpayer and not to the interests of the tax-
payer’s creditors.  In section III.B, this Note analyzes the application
and purpose of state recording acts when integrated with a federal tax
lien.  Next, in section III.C, this Note argues against a court’s treat-
ment of the IRS as a creditor without notice.  That section further dis-
cusses a possible undeveloped argument that a docketed divorce
decree dividing interest in property should qualify as constructive or
inquiry notice upon the IRS when a tax lien arises.  The Note con-
cludes, in section III.D, with suggestions of judicial and legislative so-
lutions to standardize the treatment of the IRS in tax lien proceedings
with regards to conveyances contained in unrecorded divorce decrees.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Fifth Circuit Approach
The first case in this line of litigation was United States v. Creamer
Industries, Inc.,9 decided under Texas state law in the Fifth Circuit.
While not a divorce case, Creamer’s reasoning with regard to unre-
corded conveyances and federal tax liens have been the basis for sub-
sequent divorce-related rulings.10  On January 21, 1959, Creamer
Industries, Inc. (Creamer) and the Maxwell Steel Company, Inc. (Max-
well) entered into a contract to transfer and convey all of Maxwell’s
assets to Creamer.  The contract failed to list six lots, five of which the
IRS subsequently levied, on March 24, 1959, to enforce a tax lien
against Maxwell.  On April 1, 1959, the corrected deed was delivered
and backdated to January 21, 1959, but it was not recorded until April
28, 1959.11  The court, without explanation, proclaimed that, “[a]s to
the taxes owed to it, the United States was a ‘creditor’ within the
9. 349 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1965).
10. William D. Elliott, Fifth Circuit-Taxation 2010, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 825, 834
(2010) (“The root cases in the Fifth Circuit are United States v. Creamer Indus-
tries, Inc. and Prewitt v. United States.”).
11. Creamer, 349 F.2d at 626.
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Texas recording statute,”12 and was, thus, “protected by the
statute.”13
However, the dissent proclaimed this was “a startling result.”14
Judge Brown added, “Congress has not said that this Nation has a tax
lien against any and all property once owned by a delinquent taxpayer
to the same extent as some innocent purchaser or judgment creditor
might have under local recordation statutes.”15  Furthermore, the
“[t]axpayer [Maxwell] here had no right in or to the property,” and
there were no cases supporting “the faintest hope that Max-
well, . . . had any rights, legal or equitable, against anyone . . . to get
the property back or assert any interest in it.”16
Twenty-one years later, in Prewitt v. United States,17 the Fifth Cir-
cuit encountered a similar case, this time involving an unrecorded
conveyance in the context of divorce proceedings.  The pertinent facts
of Prewitt are as follows: Prior to September 9, 1982, James and Jo-
hanna Damon were married and owned the property at dispute in the
case.  They divorced on that date and property was awarded to Jo-
hanna.  The decree was entered but not recorded until after a tax levy
was imposed on James, due to various illegal activities he had com-
mitted.  Later, Robert Prewitt purchased the property from Johanna
without knowledge of the tax lien against James.  Subsequently, on
12. The Texas recording statute at the time read:
All bargains, sales and other conveyances whatever, of any land, ten-
ements and hereditaments, whether they may be made for passing any
estate of freehold of inheritance or for a term of years; and deeds of set-
tlement upon marriage, whether land, money or other personal thing;
and all deeds of trust and mortgages shall be void as to all creditors and
subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration without notice, un-
less they shall be acknowledged or proved and filed with the clerk, to be
recorded as required by law; but the same as between the parties and
their heirs, and as to all subsequent purchasers, with notice thereof or
without valuable consideration, shall be valid and binding.
1925 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. 6627.  The current Texas recording act reads:
(a) A conveyance of real property or an interest in real property or a
mortgage or deed of trust is void as to a creditor or to a subsequent pur-
chaser for a valuable consideration without notice unless the instrument
has been acknowledged, sworn to, or proved and filed for record as re-
quired by law.
(b) The unrecorded instrument is binding on a party to the instrument,
on the party’s heirs, and on a subsequent purchaser who does not pay a
valuable consideration or who has notice of the instrument.
(c) This section does not apply to a financing statement, a security agree-
ment filed as a financing statement, or a continuation statement filed for
record under the Business & Commerce Code.
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.001 (2009).
13. Creamer, 349 F.2d at 628.
14. Id. at 629 (Brown, J., dissenting).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 792 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1986).
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about August 10, 1983, the IRS seized the property, prompting
Prewitt to sue to attack the levy.18
The Prewitt court affirmed the decision of the district court in favor
of the IRS, holding that the IRS “filed a federal tax lien against
[James] after the divorce decree became final but before it was prop-
erly recorded.”19  The court additionally affirmed that the “IRS was a
creditor without notice of the property division, notwithstanding the
filing of the divorce decree in state court or the discussion between
Johanna and the [IRS] special agents.”20
Interestingly enough, the Prewitt court found that James’ property
interest was not enforceable since the divorce decree had become final
two months prior to the date the tax lien arose.21  The court then pro-
ceeded to call it a “somewhat appealing[ ] . . . argument” but eventu-
ally discarded this finding because the majority in Creamer had
rejected an identical argument.22  In doing so the court said the “IRS
may take advantage of state recording statutes, and the right of cer-
tain of James’ creditors to reach property he formerly owned until the
disposition is properly recorded is sufficient to support a tax lien on
the property.”23
Prewitt was not without its disagreement about the interest left in
the conveying delinquent taxpayer.  In his concurrence, Judge Jolly
stated that he “concur[red] because, and only because [the court was]
bound by [its] own precedent,” referring to the court’s previous
Creamer decision.24  He stated that he fully agreed with the reasoning
in the dissenting opinion in Creamer.25  “Whatever the lien attached
to,” Judge Jolly added, “it did not attach to this property because it in
no way, shape or form belonged to the taxpayer.”26 Even though
Judge Jolly’s arguments only made it to the level of a concurring opin-
ion, the majority of circuits have supported his reasoning.
18. Id. at 1354–55.
19. Id. at 1354.
20. Id. at 1355. See infra section III.C (discussing the possible argument involving
notice given to the IRS, thus denying the IRS the position of being a creditor
without notice).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1355–56.  In agreeing with the Creamer decision the court supported the
finding that the IRS, in similar situations, is a “creditor without notice” and was
protected by the recording statute. Id. at 1355.  For a discussion on how the
Prewitt and Creamer courts reasoned that the IRS was a creditor, see subsection
III.C.1, supra.
24. Id. at 1359 (Jolly, J., concurring).
25. Id.
26. Id.
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B. The Majority Approach
The first notable case in the majority approach was the First Cir-
cuit’s decision in United States v. V & E Engineering & Construction
Co.27  This decision, while also not a divorce case, began the departure
from the reasoning of Creamer and Prewitt.28  In 1978 and 1979 the
government made tax assessments against V & E Engineering (V & E)
for failure to pay withholding taxes.  During this period V & E owned
the parcel of real property at issue in the case.  On April 22, 1980, V &
E mortgaged the property to the bank to guarantee a promissory note.
Then on May 2, 1980, V & E executed purchase and sale agreements
where it sold the property, but neither conveyance was recorded until
April 25, 1982.  On May 21, 1980, the IRS filed a tax lien on the prop-
erty.  In 1985, the United States brought action to foreclose tax liens
on property purchased from the taxpayer.29
The court ultimately held that a § 6321 lien does not attach to
property that a taxpayer had previously conveyed by an unrecorded
deed of sale, concluding that “a taxpayer, once having sold his prop-
erty, no longer has a ‘right’ to that property within the meaning of
section 6321.”30  The court began its analysis by looking to the Puerto
Rico recording act.31  The government argued that this “race-notice”
statute “means that the seller of such a property retains the ‘right’ to
transfer it after he has once sold it, provided the original purchaser
has not yet recorded.”32  The court could not accept the argument,
stating that “[u]nless the statutes provide otherwise, they should not
be presumed to give any ‘right’ to a vendor to convey the same piece of
property to two purchasers.”33  It expounded further by writing that
the ability to engage in fraudulent transfers is not to be included
within the “rights” of the party.34  In affirming the district court’s rul-
ing the court stated that “[u]nder this provision, a vendor is bound by
27. 819 F.2d 331 (1st Cir. 1987).
28. See Elliott, supra note 10, at 836.
29. V & E Eng’g & Constr., 819 F.2d at 332–33.
30. Id. at 333.
31. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 3822 (1987) provided:
If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the own-
ership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken pos-
session thereof in good faith, if it should be personal property. Should it
be real property, it shall belong to the person acquiring it who first re-
corded it in the registry. Should there be no entry, the property shall
belong to the person who first took possession of it in good faith, and, in
the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided
there is good faith.
William D. Elliott wrote that the main departure from the Fifth Circuit was the
court’s interpretation of the jurisdiction’s recording statute.  Elliott, supra note
10, at 836.
32. V & E Eng’g & Constr., 819 F.2d at 333.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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the sale of his property, regardless of the recording of that sale by the
purchaser.  He, therefore, has no ‘right to property’ under 26 U.S.C.
§ 6321.”35
While V & E Engineering was the first in the majority’s line of
cases, the next major case was decided by the Eighth Circuit, eight
years later. Thomson v. United States36 was the first case in the ma-
jority’s line that directly dealt with the unrecorded conveyance in the
context of a transfer of property by way of a divorce decree.  Douglas
and Mary Thomson divorced in 1971 and the court awarded Mary the
couple’s home.  The “decree provided that Douglas would ‘execute all
necessary documents to effectively vest ownership in [Mary] and upon
failure to do so such ownership shall vest in [Mary] by this Decree.’”37
The couple, while still making mortgage payments, took out a second
mortgage for a $140,000 loan.  The next year, 1983, Douglas mort-
gaged it again without Mary’s knowledge.  Both mortgages were re-
corded.  In 1985, the vendors of the home executed a warranty deed to
the couple.  It was not recorded.  In 1991, Douglas was assessed
$179,752 in unpaid income tax, creating a lien on all of his property
under 26 U.S.C. § 6321.  The IRS levied the house to collect Douglas’s
interest, and Mary, the next day, recorded the divorce decree and then
brought suit to terminate the levy.38
The court ultimately concluded that the Minnesota recording act
gave “Douglas no property right in the home to which the govern-
ment’s lien may attach.”39  The court, while looking to state law to
determine the taxpayer’s interest in said property, chose to address
the lower court’s assumption, and that of the Fifth Circuit, that the
IRS was the equivalent of a “judgment creditor without notice.”40  The
Thomson court said that “Congress could clothe a government tax lien
with the rights and powers of a hypothetical bona fide purchaser or
judgment creditor,” but questioned whether the statute does so “when
it provides that a person’s unpaid taxes ‘shall be a lien . . . upon all
property and rights to property . . . belonging to such person.’ ”41
The Eighth Circuit developed its reasoning by citing United States
Supreme Court precedent “in construing § 6321: ‘The Federal statute
relates to the taxpayer’s rights to property and not to his creditors’
rights.’”42  The Thomson court declined to follow Creamer and Prewitt,
finding the reasoning of V & E Engineering to be more in line with the
35. Id. at 334.
36. 66 F.3d 160 (8th Cir. 1995).
37. Id. at 161 (alteration to divorce decree in original).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 161–62 (quoting I.R.C. § 6321 (2006) (emphasis added by court)).
42. Id. at 162 (quoting United States v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 727
(1985)); see United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 690–91 (1983) (“[T]he Govern-
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Supreme Court’s reasoning in National Bank of Commerce and with
the wording of § 6321.43
However, the court in Thomson did not rule against the govern-
ment just yet.  They still found it necessary to examine the state’s re-
cording act.  When a recording statute “provide[s] that a conveyance
has no effect ‘in passing title’ until recorded . . . the transferor seem-
ingly retains an interest to which the § 6321 lien may attach.”44  Nev-
ertheless, “if a State’s recording act only makes an unrecorded
transfer void or voidable as against subsequent judgment creditors or
bona fide purchasers, the transferor retains no post-transfer inter-
est.”45  The Minnesota recording act46 was determined to protect pur-
chasers of real estate who relied on the records, which basically meant
judgment creditors and subsequent bona fide purchasers.47
The final case in the trilogy of the majority was United States v.
Gibbons,48 decided mere months after Thomson.  In 1970 Betty and
David Gibbons acquired title to the disputed property in joint tenancy.
They divorced in 1982 and the divorce decree awarded the house to
Betty, but the decree was never recorded.  Between 1984 and 1990 the
IRS filed tax liens against David for nonpayment of taxes.  The IRS
then brought suit to obtain a judgment on federal tax assessments
against the taxpayer, David, and to foreclose liens upon real property
in which he had an interest.49  After determining that the divorce de-
cree did convey an interest to Betty, the court concluded that “the IRS
lien against property ‘belonging to’ David” did not extend to Betty’s
property interest.50
The Gibbons court began its analysis by wading through the previ-
ously mentioned cases and then proceeded to interpret the Colorado
recording act.51  The court embraced the reasoning of the First and
ment’s lien under § 6321 cannot extend beyond the property interests held by the
delinquent taxpayer.”).
43. Thomson, 66 F.3d at 163.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. MINN. STAT. § 507.34 (1986) read:
[E]very such conveyance not so recorded shall be void as against any
subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a valuable consideration of
the same real estate, or any part thereof, whose conveyance is first duly
recorded, and as against any attachment levied thereon or any judgment
lawfully obtained at the suit of any party against the person in whose
name the title to such land appears of record prior to the recording of
such conveyance.
47. Thomson, 66 F.3d at 163 (quoting Miller v. Hennen, 438 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Minn.
1989)).
48. 71 F.3d 1496 (10th Cir. 1995).
49. Id. at 1498.
50. Id. at 1501.
51. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-35-109 (1995) provided that:
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Eighth Circuits, thus rejecting the analysis of the Fifth Circuit.52  In
focusing on the state’s recording act, it stated that “[a]lthough the Col-
orado statute provides that an unrecorded conveyance is void ‘as
against any class of persons with any kind of rights who first records,’
it also continues—‘except between the parties thereto and such as
have notice thereof.’ ”53  The court added that “[t]he separation agree-
ment, although unrecorded, prevents David [delinquent taxpayer]
from contesting Betty’s [former spouse] ownership,” and that the “IRS
must stand in the shoes of David Gibbons, who has no ‘rights to prop-
erty,’ . . . to which the tax lien could attach.”54
C. IRS General Counsel Memorandum 24,039 (June 18, 2010)
On June 18, 2010, the IRS released a Chief Counsel advisory rul-
ing directly on point to the topic at hand.55  While IRS memorandums
are not binding,56 they do provide insight into the reasoning of the
IRS under certain circumstances.57  For purposes of the memoran-
dum, Husband and Wife acquired real property during their marriage.
They subsequently divorced and the divorce decree awarded the prop-
erty to the Wife.  The Husband was ordered to execute a quitclaim
deed which was not recorded.  After the divorce was final, the Hus-
band was assessed post-divorce tax liabilities.  These liabilities were
not paid and resulted in a tax lien on the aforementioned property.
Later, the Wife recorded the divorce decree.58
The IRS ruled that the Husband did retain an interest in the prop-
erty that was subject to the lien.59  The IRS stated that it believes that
“the reasoning of the First, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits is flawed” and
that the Creamer/Prewitt line of cases was correctly decided.60  In do-
No such unrecorded instrument or document shall be valid as against
any class of persons with any kind of rights who first records, except
between the parties thereto and such as have notice thereof.
52. Gibbons, 71 F.3d at 1501.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 24,039 (June 18, 2010).
56. I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) (2006) states that “[u]nless the Secretary [of the Treasury]
otherwise establishes by regulations, a written determination may not be used or
cited as precedent.”
57. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCI-
PLES AND POLICIES 74 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 6th ed. 2009) (“[T]axpayers
routinely cite private rulings when it advantageous to do so and courts occasion-
ally cite them as reflecting the IRS position.”  The balance that must be struck is
that of “between fairness to similarly situated taxpayers and the administrative
necessity to give only a relatively low level of review to private rulings within the
IRS.”).
58. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 24,039, at 1 (June 18, 2010).
59. Id. at 5.
60. Id.
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ing so, the IRS elevated itself to the status of a protected creditor and
ruled that the unrecorded conveyance had no effect on it.61
The IRS began its analysis by looking to the relevant state law.62
It started by citing a Tennessee Bankruptcy decision requiring that a
divorce decree is not effective in conveying property against creditors
and bona fide purchasers until it is registered.63  The IRS then quickly
went through the analysis of the Fifth Circuit and of the majority,
ultimately favoring the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit.64  The IRS was
adamant in its position, stating that the majority side of the circuits
was wrong in its decisions.65  It expounded, saying “[t]hose courts
failed to give full meaning to state statutes that provide that a trans-
fer is void or ineffective as to certain parties absent recording.”66  It
solidified its decision by citing another bankruptcy case which stated,
“unrecorded conveyances, at least insofar as they affect the rights of
creditors, are void.”67
III. ANALYSIS
A split continues as to whose interest a § 6321 Federal Tax Lien
attaches: does it attach to the interest of the taxpayer or the tax-
payer’s creditors?  Due to the language of § 6321, the purpose of state
recording acts, and the impropriety of treating the IRS as a creditor
without notice, § 6321 federal tax liens should only attach to the tax-
payer’s interest and not to the interests of the taxpayer’s creditors.
Thus, the focus of the analysis section of this Note will be on the first
prong of the Supreme Court’s test: determining what rights a tax-
payer has in the property.68
61. Id. The memo did not delve into the details of how it decided that the IRS was a
creditor under the statute, only citing to Creamer and Prewitt as authority. Id. at
2–4.  For a discussion on how the Prewitt and Creamer courts reasoned that the
IRS was a creditor, see subsection III.C.1.
62. Since the taxpayers were in the jurisdiction of Tennessee, General Counsel
looked to the Tennessee recording act, which provides:
All of the instruments mentioned in § 66-24-101 shall have effect be-
tween the parties to the same, and their heirs and representatives, with-
out registration; but as to other persons, not having actual notice of
them, only from the noting thereof for registration on the books of the
register, unless otherwise expressly provided.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-26-101 (West 2011).
63. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 24,039, at 2 (June 18, 2010) (citing In re Frasier, 47 B.R.
864 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985)).
64. Id. at 2–3.
65. Id. at 5.
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting In re Hurst, 27 B.R. 740, 746 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2003)).
68. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.  Whether that interest is classified as
“property” or “rights to property” is beyond the scope of this Note.
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A. The Taxpayer or the Taxpayer’s Creditors?
The United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, con-
firmed that courts should first look to the relevant state law to deter-
mine a taxpayer’s rights or interest with regards to a § 6321 federal
tax lien.69  A question still remains in the circuits as to whether the
language of § 6321, in saying that a lien exists “upon all property and
rights to property, . . . belonging to such person,”70 means the rights of
the individual taxpayer or the rights of his creditors.71  However, it
appears that the United States Supreme Court has already answered
this question.72
In construing the language of § 6321 the Supreme Court stated
that “[t]he federal statute relates to the taxpayer’s rights to property
and not to his creditors’ rights.”73  In addition, the Court has reasoned
“that the Government’s lien under § 6321 cannot extend beyond the
property interests held by the delinquent taxpayer.”74  It is under-
standable that the Creamer court had a different interpretation of
§ 6321—the Supreme Court had not yet ruled specifically on that lan-
guage.  What is troublesome is the complete omission of the National
Bank of Commerce and Rodgers rulings by the Prewitt court.75  Lower
courts within the jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit have recognized this
discrepancy and suggested that the Supreme Court would not uphold
the reasoning of Creamer and Prewitt.76  As expected, outside of the
69. Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 58 (1999); see Aquilino v. United States, 363
U.S. 509, 509 (1960) (holding that in applying § 6321, the taxpayer’s “rights to
property” are determined by state law); Steve R. Johnson, The Good, the Bad,
and the Ugly in Post-Drye Tax Lien Analysis, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 415, 421 (2002)
(stating that courts look to state law in the first prong of the test and determine
“what powers or privileges does the delinquent taxpayer ha[s] as to the underly-
ing property” and asking whether “the taxpayer [can] receive, use, or benefit from
the property, or prevent others from doing so”).
70. I.R.C. § 6321 (2006) (emphasis added).
71. Compare United States v. Gibbons, 71 F.3d 1496 (10th Cir. 1995) (arguing that
§ 6321 only encompasses the rights of the individual taxpayer), and Thomson v.
United States, 66 F.3d 160 (8th Cir. 1995) (same), with Prewitt v. United States,
792 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1986) (arguing that the language of § 6321 includes the
right of the taxpayer’s creditors).
72. In addition, leading commentators have called for § 6321 to be amended to not
include the unrecorded sales of a delinquent taxpayer when determining property
of the taxpayer.  Marilyn Phelan, Texas Tech Professor’s Statements at IRS Com-
mission Meeting on Taxpayer Rights, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 26, 1997, available
at LEXIS, 97 TNT 39-71.
73. United States v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 727 (1985).
74. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 690–91 (1983).
75. Prewitt was decided three years after Rodgers and one year and four days after
Nat’l Bank of Commerce.
76. Stafford v. Lunsford, 53 S.W.3d 906, 910 (Tex. App. 2001) (“[I]t seems unlikely
the United States Supreme Court would agree with Creamer and Prewitt.”).
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Fifth Circuit, the contradiction has also been noticed.77  Nevertheless,
Creamer and Prewitt, even in light of this tension, have still been fol-
lowed as the law.78
The decisions in National Bank of Commerce and Rodgers do not
leave the Fifth Circuit or the IRS with much room to justify their posi-
tions.  Lower courts that have accurately applied National Bank of
Commerce and Rodgers have run in direct opposition to Creamer and
Prewitt.79  In the IRS Memorandum the government even quoted Ten-
nessee case law, stating that a “vendor, by the execution of the deed,
has divested himself of his legal estate; no title, legal or equitable,
remains in him.”80  The IRS then distinguished this authority by cit-
ing to another case, Hays v. McGuire, which said that “[a]s to certain
parties, conveyances have no effect until registration.”81  The IRS
treated this as an enforcement of its rights as a creditor.  However, if
the IRS had read farther down in the Hays opinion it would have seen
that the ultimate decision of the court was less favorable to its argu-
ment.  The Hays court stated that the recording act did not alter the
rights or conveyance between the grantor and the grantee.82  In actu-
ality the decision of this case reversed the lower court and remanded
it, “giving effect to the title papers, as between grantor and grantee,
from the date of their execution.”83  This would show that the Tennes-
77. See United States v. Gibbons, 71 F.3d 1496, 1501 (10th Cir. 1995) (suggesting the
inconsistency of Nat’l Bank of Commerce with Creamer and Prewitt); Thomson v.
United States, 66 F.3d 160, 162–63 (8th Cir. 1995) (same).
78. Nakissa v. Turner, No. SA-07-CV-171-RF, 2009 WL 5184215, at *3 (W.D. Tex.
Jan. 21, 2009) (following Prewitt and Creamer in finding that property recorded
in a different county than where it was located and, after the filing of a federal
tax lien, was subsequently recorded in the county where it was located, did not
defeat a federal tax lien assed before the second recording); Stafford, 53 S.W.3d
at 910 (stating that they “strongly disapprove of Creamer and Prewitt, but it is
plain, as a matter of law, that their interpretation of § 6321 placed a dark cloud
on Stafford’s [ex-spouse of delinquent taxpayer’s] property”); see Elliott, supra
note 10, at 832–39 (writing that there is “a continuation of the Fifth Circuit
outside the mainstream of federal circuits on the issue of the effect of an unre-
corded divorce decree on lien priorities”).
79. See Gardner v. United States, 34 F.3d 985, 988 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting 4 BORIS
I. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 111.5.4, at
111–12 (1981)) (“[T]he tax collector not only steps into the taxpayer’s shoes but
most go barefoot if the shoes wear out.”).  Other lower courts, in anticipating the
rulings in Nat’l Bank of Commerce and Rodgers, also similarly reasoned. See St.
Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States, 617 F.2d 1293, 1301 (8th Cir. 1980) (“The
IRS acquires by its lien and levy no greater right to the property than the tax-
payer himself has at the time the tax lien arises.”); Avco Delta Corp. Canada Ltd.
v. United States, 459 F.2d 436, 441 (7th Cir. 1972) (“[T]he government’s lien does
not exceed the rights of the taxpayer.”).
80. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 24,039, at 4–5 (June 18, 2010) (quoting Shields v. Mitch-
ell, 18 Tenn. (10 Yer.) 1, 6 (1836)).
81. Id. at 5 (citing Hays v. McGuire, 16 Tenn. (8 Yer.) 92, 100 (1835)).
82. Hays, 16 Tenn. at 100.
83. Id. at 101.
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see Supreme Court recognizes that there would be no interest left in
the delinquent spouse when it was conveyed to the ex-spouse.  If there
is nothing left in the delinquent spouse, the IRS has no interest to
which it can attach its lien.
This being so, the first part of the IRS’s reasoning in the June 18th
Memorandum is wrong.  They, along with the Fifth Circuit, have re-
moved a procedural step in determining whose interest in the prop-
erty the lien can attach.  Section 6321 does not say “all property
belonging to such person and their creditors.”  As the Thomson court
wrote, “[t]he plain meaning of the words ‘belonging to’ suggests that
the lien attaches to property interests owned by the taxpayer, not the
property interests vulnerable to the taxpayer’s judgment creditors.  As
every bankruptcy trustee knows, the latter is a potentially larger uni-
verse.”84  Congress, in writing § 6321, could have made the lien attach
to the interest of the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s creditors.85  They
did not.  Thus, any analysis that overlooks whether the delinquent
taxpayer himself had any interest in the property at the time of the
creation of the lien is incorrect from the beginning.  Any further analy-
sis by a court or the IRS is moot, being based on an ill-informed
assumption.
B. Incorporation of State Recording Acts
Once it is determined that the correct focal point of the lien attach-
ment is on the taxpayer, not the taxpayer’s creditors, it is still neces-
sary to look to the applicable state recording act to determine if the
taxpayer retained any interest after such conveyance.  Recording acts
are used to “protect subsequent parties who have no notice of the un-
recorded instrument, but the instrument is duly enforceable between
the parties who have notice to the transaction.”86  The underlying pol-
84. Thomson v. United States, 66 F.3d 160, 162 (8th Cir. 1995).
85. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS AP-
PROACH 628 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 6th ed. 2009) (“The U.S. government could
have enacted a statute giving federal tax liens priority over all other liens against
the debtor’s property.”).
86. City of Omaha v. Morello, 257 Neb. 869, 879, 602 N.W.2d 1, 6 (1999) (emphasis
added).  Currently, forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have record-
ing statutes with a “notice” component. See Milton R. Friedman & James
Charles Smith, Friedman on Contracts and Conveyances of Real Property app.
8A, at 8A-3 to -75 (2010), available at Westlaw PLIREF-CONREL.  Only Dela-
ware, Louisiana, and North Carolina have pure “race” recording acts. Id.  In ad-
dition, thirteen states have specifically legislated that the conveyance, even
without recording, is valid between the parties to it. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 40.17.080(b) (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-412 (2010); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 38-35-109 (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-815 (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2223
(2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 183, § 4 (2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-5-3 (1972);
MO. REV. STAT. § 442.400 (2000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-238 (Reissue 2009); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 111.315 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-28-14 (2004); TEX. PROP.
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icy of the recording is that “[w]here one of two persons must suffer
loss . . . he who . . . by his negligent conduct made it possible for the
loss to occur, must bear the loss.”87  This would seem to be the justifi-
cation of the conclusions reached by the minority view.  The conveyee,
the non-delinquent ex-spouse, has not fulfilled his duty to record the
transfer of the property, thus his “negligent conduct” suggests that he
should bear the loss.  However, in certain divorce cases the divorce
decree will result in tasking not the receiving party with the responsi-
bility of recording, but the conveyor—the delinquent ex-spouse.88
This would seem to run afoul of the policy behind the recording acts.
The government would in turn be taking legally transferred property
away from an ex-spouse whose only “negligent conduct” was that she
trusted her ex-spouse to perform the required tasks.89
Furthermore, in divorce cases, the principal residence of the par-
ties is a large part of the agreed upon settlement.90  By allowing the
delinquent taxpayer to fulfill a post-divorce obligation by using prop-
erty that has been awarded to the ex-spouse, the separation agree-
ment would hardly be considered just.  What was most likely a
significant concession by the delinquent taxpayer has been reclaimed
by him without any compensation to the deprived party.
In an interesting parallel, premarital agreements which are final-
ized before the filing of a tax lien may prevent the attachment of prop-
erty transferred under it.91  This includes property gathered while the
couple is married and subsequently transferred after the lien is filed
to the non-debtor ex-spouse.92  Thus, the delinquent taxpayer would
have no interest in the property, thereby dissolving any possibility of
CODE. ANN. § 13.001 (West 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 342 (1989).  Louisiana,
even though governed by a “race” recording act, states that the “instrument is not
effective as to a third person until it is recorded.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3340
(2007) (emphasis added).  This could be argued to imply that the instrument
would be binding and enforceable against a party to the contract.
87. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp. v. Walters, 53 S.E.2d 520, 523 (N.C. 1949).
88. See Thomson, 66 F.3d at 161 (delinquent taxpayer spouse was ordered by the
decree to “execute all necessary documents to effectively vest ownership” in his
ex-spouse).
89. Cf. Elliot, supra note 10, at 832 (proclaiming “[d]ivorced spouses rarely monitor
the affairs, financial or otherwise, of their ex-spouse”).  Additionally, “[b]y far the
most common source of federal tax liens is payroll taxes, in the form of withhold-
ing taxes and Social Security contributions owed by employers to the U.S. govern-
ment.” LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 85, at 625.  This would describe the ex-
spouse as “negligent” unless they were aware that the delinquent ex-spouse is
current on all payroll and employment taxes.  Is this a standard that the ex-
spouse should truly have to meet?
90. See MARJORIE A. O’CONNELL, DIVORCE TAXATION ¶ 8001, at 8011 (2007) (“Housing
is a major item of an individual’s support and the marital home is frequently used
to fulfill that support need.”).
91. Id. ¶ 18603, at 18112.
92. Id.
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attaching it to the lien.93  What makes the law, and thereby the IRS,
give more authority to a premarital agreement than to a divorce
agreement?  Both agreements are contracts between the parties.94
The premarital agreement is not even filed in any county records.  Ad-
ditionally, it seems more authority would be given to a divorce decree
since it is usually approved and docketed by a court.  Timing should
not be an issue since both a premarital agreement and a separation
agreement can be completed before the tax lien is filed.  The law has
inadvertently given more security to couples who expect, or at least
contemplate, the dissolution of their marriage, than those who truly
believe in “till death do us part.”  The overall “purpose of the recording
act is to protect subsequent bona fide purchasers from unrecorded in-
struments, not to invalidate a transaction between the parties who
entered into it.”95
In their reasoning, the Fifth Circuit and the IRS quickly decided
that the IRS is a creditor or judgment creditor without notice, not even
suggesting that it may be connected to the transaction.  Many record-
ing acts specifically protect creditors or judgment creditors without
notice.96  Those who use the minority approach understand the pro-
tection given to these protected creditors and can dispose of the argu-
ment by fitting the IRS into this characterization.  A main flaw in this
reasoning is that the IRS would be in a position to knowingly take
part in conveying a piece of property that has already been
conveyed.97
C. The IRS as a Creditor Without Notice
In the view of the Fifth Circuit and the IRS, the IRS is considered
to be a creditor without notice.98  These decisions and rulings do not
explain or even reason this assumption.99  The minority’s approach,
assuming that the IRS is a protected creditor without notice, should
fail.  Additionally, courts should state a rule that a properly docketed
divorce decree, completed before the filing of a federal tax lien, is suffi-
93. Id.
94. 41 AM. JUR. 2D Husband and Wife § 89 (2005).
95. City of Omaha v. Morello, 257 Neb. 869, 879, 602 N.W.2d 1, 6 (1999).
96. See Friedman & Smith, supra note 86, app. 8A at 8A-3 to -75.
97. See Hamilton v. United States, 806 F. Supp. 326, 333 (D. Conn. 1992) (explaining
that the “Court would effectively sanction the knowing sale by a vendor of the
same piece of property to two purchasers” and that it would be “hard pressed to
believe that Congress would countenance this result”).
98. See supra section II.A.
99. See supra section II.A.  The IRS Memorandum at issue in this Note specifically
states, “[w]e have not found anything that indicates that the [IRS] would not be a
creditor under state law.”  I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 24,039, at 4 (June 18, 2010).
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cient to provide notice to the IRS.100  This rule will then have the ef-
fect of defeating any claim the IRS has in being a creditor without
notice.
1. Protecting the IRS as a Creditor
In the Fifth Circuit, the court presumptively describes the IRS as a
creditor without notice.101  Where does this justification come from?
In Prewitt, the court blindly stated that under Creamer, “the IRS was
a creditor without notice and was thus entitled to the protection” of
the recording act.102  In Creamer, the court wrote, without any analy-
sis, that “[a]s to the taxes owed to it, the Unites States was a ‘credi-
tor’” under the recording act.103  The Creamer court cited Underwood
v. United States as authority for this position; however, in the Under-
wood opinion the court only said that “[t]he United States was un-
doubtedly a creditor.”104  The Underwood court’s reasoning was thinly
supported by acknowledging the conclusion of the trial court, without
any further insight.105
The Underwood trial court reasoned that the government was a
creditor because of the similarity of its rights as to other judgment
creditors.106  It then noted that these similar rights of the tax authori-
ties included the right to sue to recover the debt, including getting a
garnishment or attachment of property.107  This similar right clearly
convinced the court that the federal tax lien treated the government
as a similar lien holder in every respect.108  The court’s presumption
and limited reasoning in why the IRS is a protected creditor is discon-
certing; further, the federal bankruptcy laws lump the federal govern-
ment into the same category as other secured creditors.109  But, the
IRS should not be on equal footing with other subsequent bona fide
creditors when it comes to satisfying a tax lien by trumping an unre-
corded conveyance pursuant to a divorce.
100. This argument has been briefly addressed by a commentator, suggesting that
“section 6323 should be amended to provide that the IRS is charged with notice of
partitions of property filed in a district court proceeding as well as with the prop-
erly recorded deeds.”  Phelan, supra note 72.
101. See Prewitt v. United States, 792 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Creamer Indus., Inc., 349 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1965).
102. Prewitt, 792 F.2d at 1355.
103. Creamer, 349 F.2d at 628 (citing Underwood v. United States, 118 F.2d 760,
760–61 (5th Cir. 1941)).
104. Underwood, 118 F.2d. at 761.
105. Id.
106. Underwood v. United States, 37 F. Supp. 824, 826–27 (E.D. Tex. 1939), aff’d, 118
F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1941).
107. Id. at 826.
108. Id. at 827.
109. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (2006).
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The Supreme Court has stated that the IRS is not an ordinary
creditor.110  Its power does not come from creditor rights but that of a
“sovereign prerogative” grounded in the constitutional power to collect
taxes.111  Additionally, the IRS has its own set of rules to play by
when it is a creditor.112  The state laws pertaining to exemptions of
property do not apply to the IRS.113  The IRS cannot choose to not
enforce its claim against the delinquent taxpayer/debtor.114  Also,
while the bankruptcy code does group the government with other
creditors, it specifically disallows any discharge to that debt.115  These
added perks give the IRS much more power to collect on its debt than
any other creditor, secured or otherwise, has at its own disposal.
What happens if the IRS is unable to use the unrecorded convey-
ance to satisfy this debt?  A private creditor can sue but has limits to
what he can go after to satisfy the debt.  The government’s tax lien
however, is only a part of the “collection machinery” of the IRS.116
The IRS is not specifically targeting the unrecorded property.  Its goal
is to collect payment for past due taxes.  Furthermore, the government
has the threat of criminal prosecution and imprisonment to motivate
the delinquent taxpayer to pay.117  The taxes should be paid, but the
IRS should not have the ability to strip an ex-spouse from conveyed
property because of an administrative recording oversight.  A more eq-
uitable outcome would result if delinquent taxpayers paid the tax due
with their own interest, or if need be, with jail time.
110. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 697 (1983).
111. Id.; cf. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259–60 (1935); Phillips v. Comm’r, 283
U.S. 589, 595–97 (1931); United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210, 214–15 (1893).
The IRS, unlike other creditors, taxes and does not extend credit. BORIS I. BITT-
KER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶
111A.4.3, at S111A-34 to -35 (Supp. No. 3 Part II 2011), available at 2007 WL
2325534.  While the government cannot protect itself in the same way as an ordi-
nary creditor, the “general rule is that the tax collector prevails even if he has not
recorded at all.” Id. (quoting United States v. McDermott, 507 U.S. 447, 455
(1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 85, at 629. See also Timothy R. Zinnecker,
Resolving Priority Disputes Between the IRS and the Secured Creditor Under Re-
vised U.C.C. Article 9: And the Winner Is . . . ?, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 921, 924 (2002)
(noting that a “tax lien becomes enforceable against the taxpayer without the
necessity of any filing, so its existence may come as a surprise, not only to the
taxpayer but also to its creditors”).
113. Id.; see MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN & LESLIE BOOK, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶
14.07[1][d], at 14–54 (2004) (stating that “any state statute purporting to exempt
specified property from the claims of creditors is not effective against the general
tax lien”), available at 1999 WL 1051006, *3.
114. McDermott, 507 U.S. at 455.
115. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2006).
116. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 111, ¶ 111A.4.1 at S111A-25.
117. I.R.C. § 7203 (2006).
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2. Notice to the IRS
Currently, forty-eight jurisdictions have provisions in their record-
ing statutes that require a subsequent encumbrancer to be without
notice of a prior unrecorded conveyance in order to invalidate the
transfer.118  It would therefore be prudent to decipher what is re-
quired to put the IRS on notice of the transfer and whether a docketed
divorce decree should suffice.119
Courts have recognized three types of notice: actual notice, con-
structive notice, and inquiry notice.120  Actual and constructive notice
have been shown to destroy the ability of the IRS to be a creditor in
good faith.121  The lower court in the Thomson case correctly acknowl-
edged that when the IRS was actually notified of the divorce decree,
which divested the delinquent taxpayer of the interest in the property,
they were on notice for any subsequent liens.122  Furthermore, “oral
notice to an agent of the IRS is sufficient to defeat reliance on the
118.  FRIEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 86, app. 8A at 8A-3 to -75.
119. Commentators have advocated for the amending of § 6321 to “provide that the
IRS is charged with notice of partitions of property filed in a district court pro-
ceeding as well as with properly recorded deeds.”  Phelan, supra note 72.
120. FRIEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 86, app. 8A at 8A-1 to -2.
(a) Actual Notice. Actual notice means that the purchaser subjectively
knows about the prior interest. This test looks to the state of mind of the
purchaser.
(b) Constructive Notice. Constructive notice means that the purchaser is
deemed to have knowledge of all recorded interests, whether or not the
grantee in fact searches title. Constructive notice is sometimes called
“record notice.”
(c) Inquiry Notice. Inquiry notice means that the purchaser subjectively
knows some facts that suggest that someone might have an unrecorded
interest in the property. Inquiry notice is less than “actual notice” be-
cause the facts known do not demonstrate that a property interest ex-
ists—only that there might be one. The purchaser has a duty to inquire
and is charged with whatever that inquiry would have revealed. The
most important aspect of inquiry notice is a duty to inspect the land; the
purchaser generally takes subject to the rights of parties in possession
and other unrecorded interests that are visible from inspection.
Id.
121. Prowse v. Walters, 941 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Tex. App. 1996) (stating that “federal
cases suggest that actual or constructive notice to the IRS of a prior unrecorded
transfer is sufficient to defeat the attachment or perfection of its tax lien, if it
would have been sufficient to defeat the interests of a subsequent purchaser
under state law”); see In re Blunt, 80 B.R. 234 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987); see also
Prewitt v. United States, 792 F.2d 1353, 1359 (5th Cir. 1986) (reasoning that if
there would have been a recorded divorce decree in the record, it would have
trumped the lien whether or not the IRS searched for it).
122. Thomson v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 1420, 1428 (D. Minn. 1994), rev’d, 66
F.3d 160 (8th Cir. 1995).  However, this was only slightly helpful to the ex-spouse
because there was a previous tax lien imposed before actual notice and the notice
did not defeat that prior lien, only the subsequent. Id.
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recording statute and to impute to the IRS knowledge of an unre-
corded transfer.”123
Constructive notice, otherwise known as record notice, imputes the
knowledge of the record to third parties, whether or not they know of
the record.124  The Thomson lower court, along with the Prewitt court,
failed to allow the unrecorded divorce decrees to suffice for this type of
notice.  The Prewitt court deemed it a matter of state law to determine
which instruments required recording and determined that, under
Texas law, a divorce decree was one such instrument.125  Thus, since
the divorce decree was not recorded, constructive notice was not avail-
able.126  The Thomson lower court nonchalantly dismissed the idea
that a tax return could suffice as constructive notice to the IRS.127
However, the court only focused on the “home address” listed on the
return saying that it did “not divulge anything about [the taxpayer’s]
ownership interest” relating to the property.128  Other courts have al-
luded to the possibility that a judgment can provide constructive no-
tice to third parties.
In Patlow v. Clark, the court compared a judgment that was for
money to one for property.129  If it was for money, then the party who
won the judgment (the ex-spouse in a divorce proceeding) would have
a lien on the money from the docketing of the judgment and would
have imputed constructive notice to all.130  The Patlow court stated
that the “judgment docket is a public record which gives constructive
notice to the world.”131  This argument has not been widely accepted,
with many courts giving the deference to state statutes that require
recording of divorce decrees.132  However, considering the ease with
which one can search public dockets nowadays,133 the public docket is
just as capable of providing constructive notice.  It should, at mini-
mum, suffice for inquiry notice.
123. Prowse, 941 S.W.2d at 227; see United States v. Purcell, 798 F. Supp. 1102, 1114
(E.D. Pa. 1991).
124. Thomson, 867 F. Supp. at 1428 (citing Miller v. Hennen, 438 N.W.2d 366, 369–70
(Minn. 1989)).
125. Prewitt, 792 F.2d at 1358.
126. Id.
127. Thomson, 867 F. Supp. at 1428.
128. Id.
129. Partlow v. Clark, 653 P.2d 568, 571–72 (Or. Ct. App. 1982), aff’d, 671 P.2d 103
(Or. 1983).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Cf. Prewitt v. United States, 792 F.2d 1353, 1358 (5th Cir. 1986).
133. See, for example, PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT ELECTRONIC RECORDS, http://www.
pacer.gov (last visited May 19, 2012), and other online databases which lessen
the burden and hassle in searching public court documents.
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In finally coming to the third type of notice, inquiry notice, courts
have found the argument stronger but still unpersuasive.134  The ba-
sis of inquiry notice is that the IRS would have actual notice of some-
thing pertaining to the property that would demand they inquire
further into the ownership interest of the property.135  The Prewitt
court did not accurately look into this argument, eventually merging it
with its constructive notice analysis.136  The Thomson lower court
used inquiry, or implied, notice to mean that the ex-spouse had to
show “possession” of the property.137  This argument failed due to the
fact that the ex-spouse had not maintained “open and continuous” pos-
session of the property.138  But the court did not rule out the availabil-
ity of inquiry notice.  The courts, incorrectly, never explored whether a
divorce decree, or any actual facts that could be used to put the IRS on
inquiry of a divorce, could suffice for inquiry notice in the case.  In
filing a federal tax lien, where a taxpayer could be deprived of her
home, a docketed divorce decree should suffice to put the IRS on at
least inquiry notice of a delinquent taxpayer’s prior divorce.
Inquiry notice requires that an entity must complete a “reasonable
investigation” of information, from any source, which suggests that a
prior conveyance exists.139  Courts have also widely held that infor-
mation contained in various governmental offices that provide a public
record give notice to all title searchers.140  In addition, certain court
dockets do provide notice.  In bankruptcy, transfers to the trustee in
bankruptcy need not be recorded but are sufficient when docketed in
the bankruptcy court.141  Wills and transfers by intestate succession
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. The court stated that “a major failing of [this] argument is that there was no
divorce decree for the IRS to discover.” Id.  However, if there had been a discover-
able decree then constructive notice would have been satisfied leaving no need for
inquiry notice to come into play.
137. Thomson v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 1420, 1429–30 (D. Minn. 1994), rev’d, 66
F.3d 160 (8th Cir. 1995).
138. Id. Courts have commonly held that inquiry noticed applied when possession
was “visible, open, exclusive, and unambiguous.” WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE
A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 885 (Jesse H. Choper et al. eds., 3rd ed.
2000); see Lamb v. Lamb, 569 N.E.2d 992 (Ind. App. 1991); Ames v. Brooks, 297
P.2d 195 (Kan. 1956).  However, there are cases where ambiguous acts of posses-
sion were enough for a court to impute notice. See Miller v. Green, 58 N.W.2d 704
(Wis. 1953); see also Wineberg v. Moore, 194 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Cal. 1961) (finding
that the presence of “no trespassing” signs and personal items at the cabin were
enough to put a purchaser on inquiry notice).
139. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 138, at 882.
140. Id. at 876 n.32.
141. Id. at 876.
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need not be recorded, but can be found in the probate court records.142
These courts’ dockets do not provide any more notice to a third party
than a docketed state court divorce decree.  A docketed divorce decree,
once reviewed by a judge, is no more capable of defrauding or deceiv-
ing the IRS into avoiding attachment of a lien to a piece of property
than any of the previously mentioned judgments.143  A docketed di-
vorce decree is hardly a “rumor or ambiguous statement” which need
not be investigated further.144  With the continued automation and
computerization of public records, the time needed for the IRS to
check for any divorce decrees would not vastly decrease its ability to
file a tax lien.  It seems a small inconvenience for the government to
check the court records when the risk to an ex-spouse could mean the
loss of his home.
Another piece of information, which is available on a yearly basis
to the IRS, is the taxpayer’s tax return.  As stated above, the Thomson
lower court did not allow the address change on the tax return to im-
pute notice to the IRS.145  The court did not mention that if they filed
a tax return, the filing statuses of the parties should have been
changed from married to single.146  This annually-required document,
which requires a party to inform the IRS of the party’s marital status,
should be enough information to put the IRS on inquiry notice.
Before the divorce, the couple likely reported a status on their fed-
eral income tax return(s) of either “married filing jointly” or “married
filing separately.”147  After a couple files for divorce they are required
by law to change their filing statuses.148  The return also requires
that the name and social security number of a taxpayer’s spouse to be
listed.149  As of the due date of the return the IRS would have actual
notice of whether the couple was still married.  If they were no longer
married, how does this change not put the IRS on inquiry notice of a
142. Id.  Furthermore, certain actions in law such as eminent domain, adverse posses-
sion, and creation of certain easements do not create a recording requirement
even if reduced to judgment. Id. at 877.
143. One purpose of the recording requirement is to disallow secret conveyances.  H.
C. J., Annotation, Priority Where Senior Instrument Affecting Real Property Is
Recorded After Execution but Before Recording of Junior Instrument, 32 A.L.R.
344, 352 (1924).
144. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 138, at 883 (stating that the duty to make
a more thorough investigation does not require a subsequent purchaser to “pur-
sue rumors or ambiguous statements”).
145. Thomson v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 1420, 1428 (D. Minn. 1994), rev’d, 66
F.3d 160 (8th Cir. 1995).
146. See I.R.C. § 2 (2006).
147. Id.  An obvious flaw to this argument is the ability of a married person to file
head of household both before and after a divorce, if certain requirements are
met. Id.  In such circumstances, the annual income tax filing requirement may
not be enough to put the IRS on inquiry notice.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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divorce decree between the two taxpayers?  The IRS should be re-
quired to either investigate further or, at the very least, accept evi-
dence of the divorce decree which is presented to them to supersede its
attached tax lien.
D. Judicial and Legislative Solutions
The Supreme Court does not grant certiorari to many tax cases.150
Therefore, clarifications in tax law must come from Congress, usually
by way of Treasury regulations,151 or by the reasoning of lower
courts.152
First, Congress or the Treasury should clarify whose interest a
§ 6321 action attaches.  The clarification should be that § 6321 only
pertains to the interests available to the taxpayer at the time of the
lien and not to his creditors’ or any subsequent third party’s inter-
est.153  This solution should currently be applied by all courts because
of the Supreme Court’s rulings in National Bank of Commerce and
Rodgers, which commentators have described as requiring the IRS to
“step into the shoes” of the taxpayer.154  By following the Supreme
Court’s rule or a clarification by the Treasury, the unrecorded sales of
a delinquent taxpayer will not be available to the IRS for the satisfac-
tion of the debt.  This would force the IRS to look elsewhere in the
delinquent taxpayer’s assets to find payment and in turn not shift that
penalty to an unsuspecting, innocent ex-spouse.  The IRS would not be
out of options to collect, like a non-governmental creditor, but could
use its blanket lien powers to attach other interests.155  If there are no
assets for the IRS to acquire, the government always has the threat of
imprisonment.156
Second, courts should allow a properly docketed divorce decree
which transfers property to rebut the IRS’s presumption that the de-
linquent taxpayer still maintains an interest in the property.157  The
IRS should be put on constructive notice of the properly docketed
150. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 57, at 88 (“Certiorari is granted in only a small
portion of the federal tax cases in which it is sought—recently less than 10
percent.”).
151. See id. at 72 (quoting I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2006) which “provides that ‘the Secretary
[of the Treasury] shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforce-
ment’ of the internal revenue laws”).
152. See id. (writing that discrepancies in outcomes are common and lead to attorneys
searching for a sympathetic circuit).
153. This solution is not ground breaking, having been proposed in 1997 by Texas
Tech University Professor Marilyn Phelan.  Phelan, supra note 72.
154. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 111, ¶ 111A.4.2 at S111A-28.
155. See I.R.C. § 6321 (2006) (stating that the lien attaches to “all property and rights
to property,” not to a certain piece of property).
156. See id. § 5871.
157. See supra subsection III.C.2.
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court divorce decree.  The IRS may argue that this would increase its
burden.  However, it does not seem unfair to place the burden of pro-
ducing the evidence on the ex-spouse.  After all, the ex-spouse could
have avoided this inconvenience by assuring recordation.  This burden
of production would send a clear but equitable message.  When prop-
erty is transferred pursuant to a divorce decree, the ex-spouse should
record the decree, the deed, or both.  If the transferring document is
not recorded, the property will remain vulnerable to divestment from
other subsequent third parties, whereas with respect to the IRS, the
burden will be on the non-delinquent ex-spouse to produce the decree
but there will be no threat of losing the property.
Finally, the IRS should be put on inquiry notice of the delinquent
taxpayer’s marital status when filing a tax lien.158  Once it is deter-
mined that a lien be filed, the IRS should be required to perform a
quick check of the delinquent taxpayer’s past filing statuses.  The gov-
ernment should look for any changes from married, filing jointly or
separately, to single, or a change in a spouse’s social security number,
in the case that a taxpayer was divorced and married in the same
year.  If changes are found, the IRS should be required to gather infor-
mation from the delinquent taxpayer and any of the ex-spouses per-
taining to property transferred pursuant to the divorce.  The IRS
should be protected by requiring that any interests in the property be
shown to have been acquired before the date of the tax lien.  Not only
would this lessen the negative perception of the IRS in taking homes
away from unsuspecting ex-spouses, but providing notice to any ex-
spouses could also greatly reduce the time spent in clearing up inter-
est discrepancies.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note discussed the IRS’s continued attempts to invoke its
power to collect on a federal tax lien over a previously unrecorded con-
veyance.  This Note proceeded by describing the history of the federal
tax lien as it relates to unrecorded conveyances, especially with re-
gards to divorced taxpayers, and how the circuits are currently split in
their reasoning of their decisions.  It analyzed whose interest the tax
lien should attach, the application of various types of state recording
acts, and the treatment of the IRS as a creditor without notice.  The
Note concluded with a description of possible judicial and legislative
solutions to quell this dispute and attempt to provide a fair outcome
for all of the parties.
The IRS has many methods for collection and “proceeding by lien
and administrative levy is the most summary and severe of those rem-
158. See supra subsection III.C.2.
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edies.”159  The IRS and the courts should be particularly meticulous
and thorough when depriving a taxpayer, albeit a delinquent one, of
their property.  This is especially true when there is the possibility
that the property is a family’s home which currently belongs to an ex-
spouse who may have children residing therein.  The law should not
punish an ex-spouse for the delinquency of a former spouse thereby
allowing the delinquent spouse to satisfy a tax bill with property that
they do not rightfully own.
159. Thomson v. United States, 66 F.3d 160, 163 (8th Cir. 1995); see United States v.
Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 695–96 (1983).
